draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-09.txt		draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis.txt
	Network Working Group S. Josefsson		Network Working Group S. Josefsson
	Obsoletes: 2538 (if approved)		Obsoletes: 2538 (if approved)
	Expires: April 21, 2006		Expires: September 2, 2006
	Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS)		Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS)
	draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-09		draft-ietf-dnsext-rfc2538bis-10
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any		By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
	applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware		applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
	have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes		have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
	aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.		aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.
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	skipping to change at page 1, line 34		skipping to change at page 1, line 34
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	This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2006.		This Internet-Draft will expire on September 2, 2006.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).		Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
	Abstract		Abstract
	Cryptographic public keys are frequently published and their		Cryptographic public keys are frequently published, and their
	authenticity demonstrated by certificates. A CERT resource record		authenticity is demonstrated by certificates. A CERT resource record
	(RR) is defined so that such certificates and related certificate		(RR) is defined so that such certificates and related certificate
	revocation lists can be stored in the Domain Name System (DNS).		revocation lists can be stored in the Domain Name System (DNS).
	This document obsoletes RFC 2538.		This document obsoletes RFC 2538.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. The CERT Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. The CERT Resource Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Certificate Type Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. Certificate Type Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.2. Text Representation of CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.2. Text Representation of CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	2.3. X.509 OIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		2.3. X.509 OIDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3. Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3. Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	3.1. Content-based X.509 CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		3.1. Content-Based X.509 CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2. Purpose-based X.509 CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.2. Purpose-Based X.509 CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.3. Content-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.3. Content-Based OpenPGP CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.4. Purpose-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.4. Purpose-Based OpenPGP CERT RR Names . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.5. Owner names for IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP, and IACPKIX . . . . . 10		3.5. Owner Names for IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP, and IACPKIX . . . . . 10
	4. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. Performance Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		5. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	9. Changes since RFC 2538 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		9. Changes since RFC 2538 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	Appendix A. Copying conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
			Appendix A. Copying Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 17		Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 17
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Public keys are frequently published in the form of a certificate and		Public keys are frequently published in the form of a certificate,
	their authenticity is commonly demonstrated by certificates and		and their authenticity is commonly demonstrated by certificates and
	related certificate revocation lists (CRLs). A certificate is a		related certificate revocation lists (CRLs). A certificate is a
	binding, through a cryptographic digital signature, of a public key,		binding, through a cryptographic digital signature, of a public key,
	a validity interval and/or conditions, and identity, authorization,		a validity interval and/or conditions, and identity, authorization,
	or other information. A certificate revocation list is a list of		or other information. A certificate revocation list is a list of
	certificates that are revoked, and incidental information, all signed		certificates that are revoked, and of incidental information, all
	by the signer (issuer) of the revoked certificates. Examples are		signed by the signer (issuer) of the revoked certificates. Examples
	X.509 certificates/CRLs in the X.500 directory system or OpenPGP		are X.509 certificates/CRLs in the X.500 directory system or OpenPGP
	certificates/revocations used by OpenPGP software.		certificates/revocations used by OpenPGP software.
	Section 2 below specifies a CERT resource record (RR) for the storage		Section 2 specifies a CERT resource record (RR) for the storage of
	of certificates in the Domain Name System [1] [2].		certificates in the Domain Name System [1] [2].
	Section 3 discusses appropriate owner names for CERT RRs.		Section 3 discusses appropriate owner names for CERT RRs.
	Sections 4, 5, and 6 below cover performance, IANA, and security		Sections 4, 7, and 8 cover performance, security, and IANA
	considerations, respectively.		considerations, respectively.
	Section 9 explain the changes in this document compared to RFC 2538.		Section 9 explains the changes in this document compared to RFC 2538.
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [3].		document are to be interpreted as described in [3].
	2. The CERT Resource Record		2. The CERT Resource Record
	The CERT resource record (RR) has the structure given below. Its RR		The CERT resource record (RR) has the structure given below. Its RR
	type code is 37.		type code is 37.
	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| type | key tag |		| type | key tag |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| algorithm | /		| algorithm | /
	+---------------+ certificate or CRL /		+---------------+ certificate or CRL /
	/ /		/ /
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
	The type field is the certificate type as defined in section 2.1		The type field is the certificate type as defined in Section 2.1
	below.		below.
	The key tag field is the 16 bit value computed for the key embedded		The key tag field is the 16-bit value computed for the key embedded
	in the certificate, using the RRSIG Key Tag algorithm described in		in the certificate, using the RRSIG Key Tag algorithm described in
	Appendix B of [12]. This field is used as an efficiency measure to		Appendix B of [12]. This field is used as an efficiency measure to
	pick which CERT RRs may be applicable to a particular key. The key		pick which CERT RRs may be applicable to a particular key. The key
	tag can be calculated for the key in question and then only CERT RRs		tag can be calculated for the key in question, and then only CERT RRs
	with the same key tag need be examined. Note that two different keys		with the same key tag need to be examined. Note that two different
	can have the same key tag. However, the key MUST be transformed to		keys can have the same key tag. However, the key MUST be transformed
	the format it would have as the public key portion of a DNSKEY RR		to the format it would have as the public key portion of a DNSKEY RR
	before the key tag is computed. This is only possible if the key is		before the key tag is computed. This is only possible if the key is
	applicable to an algorithm and complies to limits (such as key size)		applicable to an algorithm and complies to limits (such as key size)
	defined for DNS security. If it is not, the algorithm field MUST be		defined for DNS security. If it is not, the algorithm field MUST be
	zero and the tag field is meaningless and SHOULD be zero.		zero and the tag field is meaningless and SHOULD be zero.
	The algorithm field has the same meaning as the algorithm field in		The algorithm field has the same meaning as the algorithm field in
	DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs [12], except that a zero algorithm field		DNSKEY and RRSIG RRs [12], except that a zero algorithm field
	indicates the algorithm is unknown to a secure DNS, which may simply		indicates that the algorithm is unknown to a secure DNS, which may
	be the result of the algorithm not having been standardized for		simply be the result of the algorithm not having been standardized
	DNSSEC [11].		for DNSSEC [11].
	2.1. Certificate Type Values		2.1. Certificate Type Values
	The following values are defined or reserved:		The following values are defined or reserved:
	Value Mnemonic Certificate Type		Value Mnemonic Certificate Type
	----- -------- ----------------		----- -------- ----------------
	0 reserved		0 Reserved
	1 PKIX X.509 as per PKIX		1 PKIX X.509 as per PKIX
	2 SPKI SPKI certificate		2 SPKI SPKI certificate
	3 PGP OpenPGP packet		3 PGP OpenPGP packet
	4 IPKIX The URL of an X.509 data object		4 IPKIX The URL of an X.509 data object
	5 ISPKI The URL of an SPKI certificate		5 ISPKI The URL of an SPKI certificate
	6 IPGP The URL of an OpenPGP packet		6 IPGP The fingerprint and URL of an OpenPGP packet
	7 ACPKIX Attribute Certificate		7 ACPKIX Attribute Certificate
	8 IACPKIX The URL of an Attribute Certificate		8 IACPKIX The URL of an Attribute Certificate
	9-252 available for IANA assignment		9-252 Available for IANA assignment
	253 URI URI private		253 URI URI private
	254 OID OID private		254 OID OID private
	255-65023 available for IANA assignment		255 Reserved
	65024-65534 experimental		256-65279 Available for IANA assignment
	65535 reserved		65280-65534 Experimental
			65535 Reserved
	These values represent the initial content of the IANA registry, see		These values represent the initial content of the IANA registry; see
	section 8.		Section 8.
	The PKIX type is reserved to indicate an X.509 certificate conforming		The PKIX type is reserved to indicate an X.509 certificate conforming
	to the profile defined by the IETF PKIX working group [9]. The		to the profile defined by the IETF PKIX working group [8]. The
	certificate section will start with a one-octet unsigned OID length		certificate section will start with a one-octet unsigned OID length
	and then an X.500 OID indicating the nature of the remainder of the		and then an X.500 OID indicating the nature of the remainder of the
	certificate section (see 2.3 below). (NOTE: X.509 certificates do		certificate section (see Section 2.3, below). (NOTE: X.509
	not include their X.500 directory type designating OID as a prefix.)		certificates do not include their X.500 directory-type-designating
	The SPKI type is reserved to indicate the SPKI certificate format		OID as a prefix.)
	[15], for use when the SPKI documents are moved from experimental
	status.
	The PGP type indicates an OpenPGP packet as described in [6] and its		The SPKI and ISPKI types are reserved to indicate the SPKI
	extensions and successors. Two uses are to transfer public key		certificate format [15], for use when the SPKI documents are moved
	material and revocation signatures. The data is binary, and MUST NOT		from experimental status. The format for these two CERT RR types
			will need to be specified later.
			The PGP type indicates an OpenPGP packet as described in [5] and its
			extensions and successors. This is used to transfer public key
			material and revocation signatures. The data is binary and MUST NOT
	be encoded into an ASCII armor. An implementation SHOULD process		be encoded into an ASCII armor. An implementation SHOULD process
	transferable public keys as described in section 10.1 of [6], but it		transferable public keys as described in Section 10.1 of [5], but it
	MAY handle additional OpenPGP packets.		MAY handle additional OpenPGP packets.
	The ACPKIX type indicate an Attribute Certificate format [10].		The ACPKIX type indicates an Attribute Certificate format [9].
	The IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP, IACPKIX types indicate a URL which will serve		The IPKIX and IACPKIX types indicate a URL that will serve the
	the content that would have been in the "certificate, CRL or URL"		content that would have been in the "certificate, CRL, or URL" field
	field of the corresponding types; PKIX, SPKI, PGP, or ACPKIX		of the corresponding type (PKIX or ACPKIX, respectively).
	respectively. The IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP and IACPKIX types are known as
	"indirect". These types MUST be used when the content is too large		The IPGP type contains both an OpenPGP fingerprint for the key in
	to fit in the CERT RR, and MAY be used at the implementer's		question, as well as a URL. The certificate portion of the IPGP CERT
	discretion. They SHOULD NOT be used where the DNS message is 512		RR is defined as a one-octet fingerprint length, followed by the
	octets or smaller, and could thus be expected to fit a UDP packet.		OpenPGP fingerprint, followed by the URL. The OpenPGP fingerprint is
			calculated as defined in RFC 2440 [5]. A zero-length fingerprint or
			a zero-length URL are legal, and indicate URL-only IPGP data or
			fingerprint-only IPGP data, respectively. A zero-length fingerprint
			and a zero-length URL are meaningless and invalid.
			The IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP, and IACPKIX types are known as "indirect".
			These types MUST be used when the content is too large to fit in the
			CERT RR and MAY be used at the implementer's discretion. They SHOULD
			NOT be used where the DNS message is 512 octets or smaller and could
			thus be expected to fit a UDP packet.
	The URI private type indicates a certificate format defined by an		The URI private type indicates a certificate format defined by an
	absolute URI. The certificate portion of the CERT RR MUST begin with		absolute URI. The certificate portion of the CERT RR MUST begin with
	a null terminated URI [5] and the data after the null is the private		a NUL-terminated URI [10] and the data after the NUL is the private
	format certificate itself. The URI SHOULD be such that a retrieval		format certificate itself. The URI SHOULD be such that a retrieval
	from it will lead to documentation on the format of the certificate.		from it will lead to documentation on the format of the certificate.
	Recognition of private certificate types need not be based on URI		Recognition of private certificate types need not be based on URI
	equality but can use various forms of pattern matching so that, for		equality but can use various forms of pattern matching so that, for
	example, subtype or version information can also be encoded into the		example, subtype or version information can also be encoded into the
	URI.		URI.
	The OID private type indicates a private format certificate specified		The OID private type indicates a private format certificate specified
	by an ISO OID prefix. The certificate section will start with a one-		by an ISO OID prefix. The certificate section will start with a one-
	octet unsigned OID length and then a BER encoded OID indicating the		octet unsigned OID length and then a BER-encoded OID indicating the
	nature of the remainder of the certificate section. This can be an		nature of the remainder of the certificate section. This can be an
	X.509 certificate format or some other format. X.509 certificates		X.509 certificate format or some other format. X.509 certificates
	that conform to the IETF PKIX profile SHOULD be indicated by the PKIX		that conform to the IETF PKIX profile SHOULD be indicated by the PKIX
	type, not the OID private type. Recognition of private certificate		type, not the OID private type. Recognition of private certificate
	types need not be based on OID equality but can use various forms of		types need not be based on OID equality but can use various forms of
	pattern matching such as OID prefix.		pattern matching such as OID prefix.
	2.2. Text Representation of CERT RRs		2.2. Text Representation of CERT RRs
	The RDATA portion of a CERT RR has the type field as an unsigned		The RDATA portion of a CERT RR has the type field as an unsigned
	decimal integer or as a mnemonic symbol as listed in section 2.1		decimal integer or as a mnemonic symbol as listed in Section 2.1,
	above.		above.
	The key tag field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer.		The key tag field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer.
	The algorithm field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer or		The algorithm field is represented as an unsigned decimal integer or
	a mnemonic symbol as listed in [12].		a mnemonic symbol as listed in [12].
	The certificate / CRL portion is represented in base 64 [16] and may		The certificate/CRL portion is represented in base 64 [16] and may be
	be divided up into any number of white space separated substrings,		divided into any number of white-space-separated substrings, down to
	down to single base 64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the		single base-64 digits, which are concatenated to obtain the full
	full signature. These substrings can span lines using the standard		signature. These substrings can span lines using the standard
	parenthesis.		parenthesis.
	Note that the certificate / CRL portion may have internal sub-fields,		Note that the certificate / CRL portion may have internal sub-fields,
	but these do not appear in the master file representation. For		but these do not appear in the master file representation. For
	example, with type 254, there will be an OID size, an OID, and then		example, with type 254, there will be an OID size, an OID, and then
	the certificate / CRL proper. But only a single logical base 64		the certificate/CRL proper. However, only a single logical base-64
	string will appear in the text representation.		string will appear in the text representation.
	2.3. X.509 OIDs		2.3. X.509 OIDs
	OIDs have been defined in connection with the X.500 directory for		OIDs have been defined in connection with the X.500 directory for
	user certificates, certification authority certificates, revocations		user certificates, certification authority certificates, revocations
	of certification authority, and revocations of user certificates.		of certification authority, and revocations of user certificates.
	The following table lists the OIDs, their BER encoding, and their		The following table lists the OIDs, their BER encoding, and their
	length-prefixed hex format for use in CERT RRs:		length-prefixed hex format for use in CERT RRs:
	skipping to change at page 7, line 4		skipping to change at page 7, line 27
	3. Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs		3. Appropriate Owner Names for CERT RRs
	It is recommended that certificate CERT RRs be stored under a domain		It is recommended that certificate CERT RRs be stored under a domain
	name related to their subject, i.e., the name of the entity intended		name related to their subject, i.e., the name of the entity intended
	to control the private key corresponding to the public key being		to control the private key corresponding to the public key being
	certified. It is recommended that certificate revocation list CERT		certified. It is recommended that certificate revocation list CERT
	RRs be stored under a domain name related to their issuer.		RRs be stored under a domain name related to their issuer.
	Following some of the guidelines below may result in DNS names with		Following some of the guidelines below may result in DNS names with
	characters that require DNS quoting as per section 5.1 of RFC 1035		characters that require DNS quoting as per Section 5.1 of RFC 1035
	[2].		[2].
	The choice of name under which CERT RRs are stored is important to		The choice of name under which CERT RRs are stored is important to
	clients that perform CERT queries. In some situations, the clients		clients that perform CERT queries. In some situations, the clients
	may not know all information about the CERT RR object it wishes to		may not know all information about the CERT RR object it wishes to
	retrieve. For example, a client may not know the subject name of an		retrieve. For example, a client may not know the subject name of an
	X.509 certificate, or the e-mail address of the owner of an OpenPGP		X.509 certificate, or the email address of the owner of an OpenPGP
	key. Further, the client might only know the hostname of a service		key. Further, the client might only know the hostname of a service
	that uses X.509 certificates or the Key ID of an OpenPGP key.		that uses X.509 certificates or the Key ID of an OpenPGP key.
	Therefore, two owner name guidelines are defined: content-based owner		Therefore, two owner name guidelines are defined: content-based owner
	names and purpose-based owner names. A content-based owner name is		names and purpose-based owner names. A content-based owner name is
	derived from the content of the CERT RR data; for example, the		derived from the content of the CERT RR data; for example, the
	Subject field in an X.509 certificate or the User ID field in OpenPGP		Subject field in an X.509 certificate or the User ID field in OpenPGP
	keys. A purpose-based owner name is a name that a client retrieving		keys. A purpose-based owner name is a name that a client retrieving
	CERT RRs ought to already know; for example, the host name of an		CERT RRs ought to know already; for example, the host name of an
	X.509 protected service or the Key ID of an OpenPGP key. The		X.509 protected service or the Key ID of an OpenPGP key. The
	content-based and purpose-based owner name may be the same; for		content-based and purpose-based owner name may be the same; for
	example, when a client looks up a key based on the From: address of		example, when a client looks up a key based on the From: address of
	an incoming e-mail.		an incoming email.
	Implementations SHOULD use the purpose-based owner name guidelines		Implementations SHOULD use the purpose-based owner name guidelines
	described in this document, and MAY use CNAME RRs at content-based		described in this document and MAY use CNAME RRs at content-based
	owner names (or other names), pointing to the purpose-based owner		owner names (or other names), pointing to the purpose-based owner
	name.		name.
	Note that this section describes an application-based mapping from		Note that this section describes an application-based mapping from
	the name space used in a certificate to the name space used by DNS.		the name space used in a certificate to the name space used by DNS.
	The DNS does not infer any relationship amongst CERT resource records		The DNS does not infer any relationship amongst CERT resource records
	based on similarities or differences of the DNS owner name(s) of CERT		based on similarities or differences of the DNS owner name(s) of CERT
	resource records. For example, if multiple labels are used when		resource records. For example, if multiple labels are used when
	mapping from a CERT identifier to a domain name then care must be		mapping from a CERT identifier to a domain name, then care must be
	taken in understanding wildcard record synthesis.		taken in understanding wildcard record synthesis.
	3.1. Content-based X.509 CERT RR Names		3.1. Content-Based X.509 CERT RR Names
	Some X.509 versions, such as the PKIX profile of X.509 [9], permit		Some X.509 versions, such as the PKIX profile of X.509 [8], permit
	multiple names to be associated with subjects and issuers under		multiple names to be associated with subjects and issuers under
	"Subject Alternative Name" and "Issuer Alternative Name". For		"Subject Alternative Name" and "Issuer Alternative Name". For
	example, the PKIX profile has such Alternate Names with an ASN.1		example, the PKIX profile has such Alternate Names with an ASN.1
	specification as follows:		specification as follows:
	GeneralName ::= CHOICE {		GeneralName ::= CHOICE {
	otherName [0] OtherName,		otherName [0] OtherName,
	rfc822Name [1] IA5String,		rfc822Name [1] IA5String,
	dNSName [2] IA5String,		dNSName [2] IA5String,
	x400Address [3] ORAddress,		x400Address [3] ORAddress,
	directoryName [4] Name,		directoryName [4] Name,
	ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,		ediPartyName [5] EDIPartyName,
	uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,		uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String,
	iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,		iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING,
	registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }		registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER }
	The recommended locations of CERT storage are as follows, in priority		The recommended locations of CERT storage are as follows, in priority
	order:		order:
	1. If a domain name is included in the identification in the		1. If a domain name is included in the identification in the
	certificate or CRL, that ought be used.		certificate or CRL, that ought to be used.
	2. If a domain name is not included but an IP address is included,		2. If a domain name is not included but an IP address is included,
	then the translation of that IP address into the appropriate		then the translation of that IP address into the appropriate
	inverse domain name ought to be used.		inverse domain name ought to be used.
	3. If neither of the above is used, but a URI containing a domain		3. If neither of the above is used, but a URI containing a domain
	name is present, that domain name ought to be used.		name is present, that domain name ought to be used.
	4. If none of the above is included but a character string name is		4. If none of the above is included but a character string name is
	included, then it ought to be treated as described for OpenPGP		included, then it ought to be treated as described below for
	names below.		OpenPGP names.
	5. If none of the above apply, then the distinguished name (DN)		5. If none of the above apply, then the distinguished name (DN)
	ought to be mapped into a domain name as specified in [4].		ought to be mapped into a domain name as specified in [4].
	Example 1: An X.509v3 certificate is issued to /CN=John Doe /DC=Doe/		Example 1: An X.509v3 certificate is issued to /CN=John Doe /DC=Doe/
	DC=com/DC=xy/O=Doe Inc/C=XY/ with Subject Alternative Names of (a)		DC=com/DC=xy/O=Doe Inc/C=XY/ with Subject Alternative Names of (a)
	string "John (the Man) Doe", (b) domain name john-doe.com, and (c)		string "John (the Man) Doe", (b) domain name john-doe.com, and (c)
	URI <https://www.secure.john-doe.com:8080/>. The storage locations		URI <https://www.secure.john-doe.com:8080/>. The storage locations
	recommended, in priority order, would be		recommended, in priority order, would be
	1. john-doe.com,		1. john-doe.com,
	2. www.secure.john-doe.com, and		2. www.secure.john-doe.com, and
	skipping to change at page 8, line 49		skipping to change at page 9, line 18
	Example 2: An X.509v3 certificate is issued to /CN=James Hacker/		Example 2: An X.509v3 certificate is issued to /CN=James Hacker/
	L=Basingstoke/O=Widget Inc/C=GB/ with Subject Alternate names of (a)		L=Basingstoke/O=Widget Inc/C=GB/ with Subject Alternate names of (a)
	domain name widget.foo.example, (b) IPv4 address 10.251.13.201, and		domain name widget.foo.example, (b) IPv4 address 10.251.13.201, and
	(c) string "James Hacker <hacker@mail.widget.foo.example>". The		(c) string "James Hacker <hacker@mail.widget.foo.example>". The
	storage locations recommended, in priority order, would be		storage locations recommended, in priority order, would be
	1. widget.foo.example,		1. widget.foo.example,
	2. 201.13.251.10.in-addr.arpa, and		2. 201.13.251.10.in-addr.arpa, and
	3. hacker.mail.widget.foo.example.		3. hacker.mail.widget.foo.example.
	3.2. Purpose-based X.509 CERT RR Names		3.2. Purpose-Based X.509 CERT RR Names
	Due to the difficulty for clients that do not already possess a		Due to the difficulty for clients that do not already possess a
	certificate to reconstruct the content-based owner name, purpose-		certificate to reconstruct the content-based owner name, purpose-
	based owner names are recommended in this section. Recommendations		based owner names are recommended in this section. Recommendations
	for purpose-based owner names vary per scenario. The following table		for purpose-based owner names vary per scenario. The following table
	summarizes the purpose-based X.509 CERT RR owner name guidelines for		summarizes the purpose-based X.509 CERT RR owner name guidelines for
	use with S/MIME [17], SSL/TLS [13], and IPsec [14]:		use with S/MIME [17], SSL/TLS [13], and IPsec [14]:
	Scenario Owner name		Scenario Owner name
	------------------ ----------------------------------------------		------------------ ----------------------------------------------
	skipping to change at page 9, line 25		skipping to change at page 9, line 43
	"postmaster.example.org".		"postmaster.example.org".
	TLS Certificate Hostname of the TLS server.		TLS Certificate Hostname of the TLS server.
	IPsec Certificate Hostname of the IPsec machine and/or, for IPv4		IPsec Certificate Hostname of the IPsec machine and/or, for IPv4
	or IPv6 addresses, the fully qualified domain		or IPv6 addresses, the fully qualified domain
	name in the appropriate reverse domain.		name in the appropriate reverse domain.
	An alternate approach for IPsec is to store raw public keys [18].		An alternate approach for IPsec is to store raw public keys [18].
	3.3. Content-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names		3.3. Content-Based OpenPGP CERT RR Names
	OpenPGP signed keys (certificates) use a general character string		OpenPGP signed keys (certificates) use a general character string
	User ID [6]. However, it is recommended by OpenPGP that such names		User ID [5]. However, it is recommended by OpenPGP that such names
	include the RFC 2822 [8] email address of the party, as in "Leslie		include the RFC 2822 [7] email address of the party, as in "Leslie
	Example <Leslie@host.example>". If such a format is used, the CERT		Example <Leslie@host.example>". If such a format is used, the CERT
	ought to be under the standard translation of the email address into		ought to be under the standard translation of the email address into
	a domain name, which would be leslie.host.example in this case. If		a domain name, which would be leslie.host.example in this case. If
	no RFC 2822 name can be extracted from the string name, no specific		no RFC 2822 name can be extracted from the string name, no specific
	domain name is recommended.		domain name is recommended.
	If a user has more than one email address, the CNAME type can be used		If a user has more than one email address, the CNAME type can be used
	to reduce the amount of data stored in the DNS. Example:		to reduce the amount of data stored in the DNS. For example:
	$ORIGIN example.org.		$ORIGIN example.org.
	smith IN CERT PGP 0 0 <OpenPGP binary>		smith IN CERT PGP 0 0 <OpenPGP binary>
	john.smith IN CNAME smith		john.smith IN CNAME smith
	js IN CNAME smith		js IN CNAME smith
	3.4. Purpose-based OpenPGP CERT RR Names		3.4. Purpose-Based OpenPGP CERT RR Names
	Applications that receive an OpenPGP packet containing encrypted or		Applications that receive an OpenPGP packet containing encrypted or
	signed data but do not know the email address of the sender will have		signed data but do not know the email address of the sender will have
	difficulties constructing the correct owner name and cannot use the		difficulties constructing the correct owner name and cannot use the
	content-based owner name guidelines. However, these clients commonly		content-based owner name guidelines. However, these clients commonly
	know the key fingerprint or the Key ID. The key ID is found in		know the key fingerprint or the Key ID. The key ID is found in
	OpenPGP packets, and the key fingerprint is commonly found in		OpenPGP packets, and the key fingerprint is commonly found in
	auxiliary data that may be available. In this case, use of an owner		auxiliary data that may be available. In this case, use of an owner
	name identical to the key fingerprint and the key ID expressed in		name identical to the key fingerprint and the key ID expressed in
	hexadecimal [16] is recommended. Example:		hexadecimal [16] is recommended. For example:
	$ORIGIN example.org.		$ORIGIN example.org.
	0424D4EE81A0E3D119C6F835EDA21E94B565716F IN CERT PGP ...		0424D4EE81A0E3D119C6F835EDA21E94B565716F IN CERT PGP ...
	F835EDA21E94B565716F IN CERT PGP ...		F835EDA21E94B565716F IN CERT PGP ...
	B565716F IN CERT PGP ...		B565716F IN CERT PGP ...
	If the same key material is stored for several owner names, the use		If the same key material is stored for several owner names, the use
	of CNAME may help to avoid data duplication. Note that CNAME is not		of CNAME may help avoid data duplication. Note that CNAME is not
	always applicable, because it maps one owner name to the other for		always applicable, because it maps one owner name to the other for
	all purposes, which may be sub-optimal when two keys with the same		all purposes, which may be sub-optimal when two keys with the same
	Key ID are stored.		Key ID are stored.
	3.5. Owner names for IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP, and IACPKIX		3.5. Owner Names for IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP, and IACPKIX
	These types are stored under the same owner names, both purpose- and		These types are stored under the same owner names, both purpose- and
	content-based, as the PKIX, SPKI, PGP and ACPKIX types.		content-based, as the PKIX, SPKI, PGP, and ACPKIX types.
	4. Performance Considerations		4. Performance Considerations
	The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol was designed for small		The Domain Name System (DNS) protocol was designed for small
	transfers, typically below 512 octets. While larger transfers will		transfers, typically below 512 octets. While larger transfers will
	perform correctly and work is underway to make larger transfers more		perform correctly and work is underway to make larger transfers more
	efficient, it is still advisable at this time to make every		efficient, it is still advisable at this time that every reasonable
	reasonable effort to minimize the size of certificates stored within		effort be made to minimize the size of certificates stored within the
	the DNS. Steps that can be taken may include using the fewest		DNS. Steps that can be taken may include using the fewest possible
	possible optional or extension fields and using short field values		optional or extension fields and using short field values for
	for necessary variable length fields.		necessary variable-length fields.
	The RDATA field in the DNS protocol may only hold data of size 65535		The RDATA field in the DNS protocol may only hold data of size 65535
	octets (64kb) or less. This means that each CERT RR MUST NOT contain		octets (64kb) or less. This means that each CERT RR MUST NOT contain
	more than 64kb of payload, even if the corresponding certificate or		more than 64kb of payload, even if the corresponding certificate or
	certificate revocation list is larger. This document addresses this		certificate revocation list is larger. This document addresses this
	by defining "indirect" data types for each normal type.		by defining "indirect" data types for each normal type.
	Deploying CERT RRs to support digitally signed e-mail change the		Deploying CERT RRs to support digitally signed email changes the
	access patterns of DNS lookups from per-domain to per-user. If		access patterns of DNS lookups from per-domain to per-user. If
	digitally signed e-mail, and a key/certificate lookup based on CERT		digitally signed email and a key/certificate lookup based on CERT RRs
	RRs, is deployed on a wide scale, this may lead to an increased DNS		are deployed on a wide scale, this may lead to an increased DNS load,
	load, with potential performance and cache effectiveness		with potential performance and cache effectiveness consequences.
	consequencess. Whether this load increase will be noticable or not		Whether or not this load increase will be noticeable is not known.
	is not known.
	5. Contributors		5. Contributors
	The majority of this document is copied verbatim from RFC 2538, by		The majority of this document is copied verbatim from RFC 2538, by
	Donald Eastlake 3rd and Olafur Gudmundsson.		Donald Eastlake 3rd and Olafur Gudmundsson.
	6. Acknowledgements		6. Acknowledgements
	Thanks to David Shaw and Michael Graff for their contributions to		Thanks to David Shaw and Michael Graff for their contributions to
	earlier works that motivated, and served as inspiration for, this		earlier works that motivated, and served as inspiration for, this
	document.		document.
	This document was improved by suggestions and comments from Olivier		This document was improved by suggestions and comments from Olivier
	Dubuisson, Scott Hollenbeck, Russ Housley, Peter Koch, Olaf M.		Dubuisson, Scott Hollenbeck, Russ Housley, Peter Koch, Olaf M.
	Kolkman, Ben Laurie, Edward Lewis, John Loughney, Allison Mankin,		Kolkman, Ben Laurie, Edward Lewis, John Loughney, Allison Mankin,
	Douglas Otis, Marcos Sanz, Pekka Savola, Jason Sloderbeck, Samuel		Douglas Otis, Marcos Sanz, Pekka Savola, Jason Sloderbeck, Samuel
	Weiler, and Florian Weimer. No doubt the list is incomplete. We		Weiler, Florian Weimer, and the IANA. No doubt the list is
	apologize to anyone we left out.		incomplete. We apologize to anyone we left out.
	7. Security Considerations		7. Security Considerations
	By definition, certificates contain their own authenticating		By definition, certificates contain their own authenticating
	signature. Thus, it is reasonable to store certificates in non-		signatures. Thus, it is reasonable to store certificates in non-
	secure DNS zones or to retrieve certificates from DNS with DNS		secure DNS zones or to retrieve certificates from DNS with DNS
	security checking not implemented or deferred for efficiency. The		security checking not implemented or deferred for efficiency. The
	results may be trusted if the certificate chain is verified back to a		results may be trusted if the certificate chain is verified back to a
	known trusted key and this conforms with the user's security policy.		known trusted key and this conforms with the user's security policy.
	Alternatively, if certificates are retrieved from a secure DNS zone		Alternatively, if certificates are retrieved from a secure DNS zone
	with DNS security checking enabled and are verified by DNS security,		with DNS security checking enabled and are verified by DNS security,
	the key within the retrieved certificate may be trusted without		the key within the retrieved certificate may be trusted without
	verifying the certificate chain if this conforms with the user's		verifying the certificate chain if this conforms with the user's
	security policy.		security policy.
	If an organization chooses to issue certificates for its employees,		If an organization chooses to issue certificates for its employees,
	placing CERT RR's in the DNS by owner name, and if DNSSEC (with NSEC)		placing CERT RR's in the DNS by owner name, and if DNSSEC (with NSEC)
	is in use, it is possible for someone to enumerate all employees of		is in use, it is possible for someone to enumerate all employees of
	the organization. This is usually not considered desirable, for the		the organization. This is usually not considered desirable, for the
	same reason enterprise phone listings are not often publicly		same reason that enterprise phone listings are not often publicly
	published and are even mark confidential.		published and are even marked confidential.
	Using the URI type introduces another level of indirection that may		Using the URI type introduces another level of indirection that may
	open a new vulnerability. One method to secure that indirection is		open a new vulnerability. One method of securing that indirection is
	to include a hash of the certificate in the URI itself.		to include a hash of the certificate in the URI itself.
	If DNSSEC is used, then the non-existence of a CERT RR and,		If DNSSEC is used, then the non-existence of a CERT RR and,
	consequently, certificates or revocation lists can be securely		consequently, certificates or revocation lists can be securely
	asserted. Without DNSSEC, this is not possible.		asserted. Without DNSSEC, this is not possible.
	8. IANA Considerations		8. IANA Considerations
	IANA needs to create a new registry for CERT RR, certificate types.		The IANA has created a new registry for CERT RR: certificate types.
	The initial contents of this registry is:		The initial contents of this registry is:
	[[RFC Editor: Replace xxxx below with the number of this RFC.]]
	Decimal Type Meaning Reference		Decimal Type Meaning Reference
	------- ---- ------- ---------		------- ---- ------- ---------
	0 Reserved RFC xxxx		0 Reserved RFC 4398
	1 PKIX X.509 as per PKIX RFC xxxx		1 PKIX X.509 as per PKIX RFC 4398
	2 SPKI SPKI certificate RFC xxxx		2 SPKI SPKI certificate RFC 4398
	3 PGP OpenPGP packet RFC xxxx		3 PGP OpenPGP packet RFC 4398
	4 IPKIX The URL of an X.509 data object RFC xxxx		4 IPKIX The URL of an X.509 data object RFC 4398
	5 ISPKI The URL of an SPKI certificate RFC xxxx		5 ISPKI The URL of an SPKI certificate RFC 4398
	6 IPGP The URL of an OpenPGP packet RFC xxxx		6 IPGP The fingerprint and URL RFC 4398
	7 ACPKIX Attribute Certificate RFC xxxx		of an OpenPGP packet
	8 IACPKIX The URL of an Attribute Certificate RFC xxxx		7 ACPKIX Attribute Certificate RFC 4398
			8 IACPKIX The URL of an Attribute RFC 4398
			Certificate
	9-252 Available for IANA assignment		9-252 Available for IANA assignment
	by IETF Standards action		by IETF Standards action
	253 URI URI private RFC xxxx		253 URI URI private RFC 4398
	254 OID OID private RFC xxxx		254 OID OID private RFC 4398
	255-65023 Available for IANA assignment		255 Reserved RFC 4398
			256-65279 Available for IANA assignment
	by IETF Consensus		by IETF Consensus
	65024-65534 Experimental RFC xxxx		65280-65534 Experimental RFC 4398
	65535 Reserved RFC xxxx		65535 Reserved RFC 4398
	Certificate types 0x0000 through 0x00FF and 0xFF00 through 0xFFFF can		Certificate types 0x0000 through 0x00FF (255) and 0xFF00 (65280)
	only be assigned by an IETF standards action [7]. This document		through 0xFFFF (65535) can only be assigned by an IETF standards
	assigns 0x0001 through 0x0008 and 0x00FD and 0x00FE. Certificate		action [6]. This document assigns 0x0001 through 0x0008 and 0x00FD
	types 0x0100 through 0xFEFF are assigned through IETF Consensus [7]		(253) and 0x00FE (254). Certificate types 0x0100 (256) through
	based on RFC documentation of the certificate type. The availability		0xFEFF (65279) are assigned through IETF Consensus [6] based on RFC
	of private types under 0x00FD and 0x00FE ought to satisfy most		documentation of the certificate type. The availability of private
			types under 0x00FD (253) and 0x00FE (254) ought to satisfy most
	requirements for proprietary or private types.		requirements for proprietary or private types.
	The CERT RR reuses the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry. In		The CERT RR reuses the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry. In
	particular, the CERT RR requires that algorithm number 0 remain		particular, the CERT RR requires that algorithm number 0 remain
	reserved, as described in Section 2. The IANA is directed to		reserved, as described in Section 2. The IANA will reference the
	reference the CERT RR as a user of this registry and value 0, in		CERT RR as a user of this registry and value 0, in particular.
	particular.
	9. Changes since RFC 2538		9. Changes since RFC 2538
	1. Editorial changes to conform with new document requirements,		1. Editorial changes to conform with new document requirements,
	including splitting reference section into two parts and		including splitting reference section into two parts and
	updating the references to point at latest versions, and to add		updating the references to point at latest versions, and to add
	some additional references.		some additional references.
	2. Improve terminology. For example replace "PGP" with "OpenPGP",		2. Improve terminology. For example replace "PGP" with "OpenPGP",
	to align with RFC 2440.		to align with RFC 2440.
	3. In section 2.1, clarify that OpenPGP public key data are binary,		3. In Section 2.1, clarify that OpenPGP public key data are binary,
	not the ASCII armored format, and reference 10.1 in RFC 2440 on		not the ASCII armored format, and reference 10.1 in RFC 2440 on
	how to deal with OpenPGP keys, and acknowledge that		how to deal with OpenPGP keys, and acknowledge that
	implementations may handle additional packet types.		implementations may handle additional packet types.
	4. Clarify that integers in the representation format are decimal.		4. Clarify that integers in the representation format are decimal.
	5. Replace KEY/SIG with DNSKEY/RRSIG etc, to align with DNSSECbis		5. Replace KEY/SIG with DNSKEY/RRSIG etc, to align with DNSSECbis
	terminology. Improve reference for Key Tag Algorithm		terminology. Improve reference for Key Tag Algorithm
	calculations.		calculations.
	6. Add examples that suggest use of CNAME to reduce bandwidth.		6. Add examples that suggest use of CNAME to reduce bandwidth.
	7. In section 3, appended the last paragraphs that discuss		7. In Section 3, appended the last paragraphs that discuss
	"content-based" vs "purpose-based" owner names. Add section 3.2		"content-based" vs "purpose-based" owner names. Add Section 3.2
	for purpose-based X.509 CERT owner names, and section 3.4 for		for purpose-based X.509 CERT owner names, and Section 3.4 for
	purpose-based OpenPGP CERT owner names.		purpose-based OpenPGP CERT owner names.
	8. Added size considerations.		8. Added size considerations.
	9. The SPKI types has been reserved, until RFC 2692/2693 is moved		9. The SPKI types has been reserved, until RFC 2692/2693 is moved
	from the experimental status.		from the experimental status.
	10. Added indirect types IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP, and IACPKIX.		10. Added indirect types IPKIX, ISPKI, IPGP, and IACPKIX.
	11. An IANA registry of CERT type values was created.		11. An IANA registry of CERT type values was created.
	Appendix A. Copying conditions
	Regarding the portion of this document that was written by Simon
	Josefsson ("the author", for the remainder of this section), the
	author makes no guarantees and is not responsible for any damage
	resulting from its use. The author grants irrevocable permission to
	anyone to use, modify, and distribute it in any way that does not
	diminish the rights of anyone else to use, modify, and distribute it,
	provided that redistributed derivative works do not contain
	misleading author or version information. Derivative works need not
	be licensed under similar terms.
	10. References		10. References
	10.1. Normative References		10.1. Normative References
	[1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",		[1] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
	STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.		STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.
	[2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and		[2] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
	specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.		specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
	[3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement		[3] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
	Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[4] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R., and S. Sataluri,		[4] Kille, S., Wahl, M., Grimstad, A., Huber, R., and S. Sataluri,
	"Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", RFC 2247,		"Using Domains in LDAP/X.500 Distinguished Names", RFC 2247,
	January 1998.		January 1998.
	[5] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform		[5] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., and R. Thayer,
	Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", RFC 2396,
	August 1998.
	[6] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., and R. Thayer,
	"OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.		"OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 2440, November 1998.
	[7] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA		[6] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA
	Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,		Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434,
	October 1998.		October 1998.
	[8] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001.		[7] Resnick, P., "Internet Message Format", RFC 2822, April 2001.
	[9] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509		[8] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
	Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate		Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
	Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.		Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.
	[10] Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute Certificate		[9] Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute Certificate
	Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April 2002.		Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April 2002.
			[10] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
			Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986,
			January 2005.
	[11] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,		[11] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
	"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,		"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033,
	March 2005.		March 2005.
	[12] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,		[12] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
	"Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,		"Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034,
	March 2005.		March 2005.
	10.2. Informative References		10.2. Informative References
	[13] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",		[13] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
	RFC 2246, January 1999.		RFC 2246, January 1999.
	[14] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the		[14] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
	Internet Protocol", RFC 2401, November 1998.		Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
	[15] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, B.,		[15] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, B.,
	and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,		and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693,
	September 1999.		September 1999.
	[16] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings",		[16] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings",
	RFC 3548, July 2003.		RFC 3548, July 2003.
	[17] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions		[17] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
	(S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851,		(S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851,
	July 2004.		July 2004.
	[18] Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying Material in		[18] Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying Material in
	DNS", RFC 4025, March 2005.		DNS", RFC 4025, March 2005.
			Appendix A. Copying Conditions
			Regarding the portion of this document that was written by Simon
			Josefsson ("the author", for the remainder of this section), the
			author makes no guarantees and is not responsible for any damage
			resulting from its use. The author grants irrevocable permission to
			anyone to use, modify, and distribute it in any way that does not
			diminish the rights of anyone else to use, modify, and distribute it,
			provided that redistributed derivative works do not contain
			misleading author or version information. Derivative works need not
			be licensed under similar terms.
	Author's Address		Author's Address
	Simon Josefsson		Simon Josefsson
	Email: simon@josefsson.org		Email: simon@josefsson.org
	Intellectual Property Statement		Intellectual Property Statement
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	Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to		Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
	skipping to change at page 17, line 41		skipping to change at page 17, line 41
	This document and the information contained herein are provided on an		This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
	"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS		"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
	OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET		OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
	ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,		ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
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	WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.		WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
	Copyright Statement		Copyright Statement
	Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). This document is subject		Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). This document is subject
	to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and		to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and
	except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.		except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
	Acknowledgment		Acknowledgment
	Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the		Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
	Internet Society.		Internet Society.
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